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As	  we	  move	  past	  the	  6th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings,	  the	  dreams	  that	  had	  driven	  
the	  protest	  movements,	  causing	  people	  to	  take	  to	  the	  streets	  and	  separating	  autocratic	  
regimes	  from	  societies	  have	  been	  extinguished.	  In	  many	  cases,	  autocratic	  rulers	  remain	  
in	   control,	   having	   mobilised	   support	   bases	   and	   implemented	   coup	   proofing	  and	  
securitization	  strategies	   to	   do	   so.	   In	   others,	   the	   battle	   rages	   and	   the	   space	   that	   was	  
created	  from	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  state	  has	  allowed	  for	  groups	   like	  Da’ish	  to	  gain	  
prominence.	  As	  a	  mechanism	  of	  control,	  a	  number	  of	  Sunni	  regimes	  sought	  to	  securitize	  
the	   Shi’a	   threat,	   framing	  minority	   groups	   as	   an	   Iranian	  5th	   column	  and	   securing	   their	  
place	  within	  the	  pantheon	  of	  Sunni	  Arab	  states	  opposed	  to	  Iran.	  	  
	  
To	  this	  end,	   this	  article	  applies	  the	  concept	  of	  securitization	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  with	  a	  
focus	  upon	  the	  securitization	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  other.	  Such	  processes	  occur	  across	  time	  and	  
space	  and	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  state	  borders,	  escaping	  the	  Westphalian	  straitjacket.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	   one	   must	   consider	   the	   construction	   of	   space	   and	   political	   structures	  
across	   the	   region	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   traction	   that	   such	   moves	   can	   find.	   It	  
appears	   then,	   that	   in	   seeking	   to	  maintain	   short	   term	   survival,	   regimes	  have	   sacrificed	  
long-­‐term	   stability,	   but	   the	   impacts	   of	   such	   moves	   transcend	   the	   typically	   linear	  
constructed	  audiences	  within	  securitization	  moves.	  A	  key	  contribution	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  
consider	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   audiences	   within	   the	   Middle	   East,	   both	   intended	   and	  
unintended,	   transcend	   the	   linear	   audiences	   found	   within	   conventional	   processes	   of	  
securitization.	  The	  article	  uses	   two	  case	  studies	  as	  a	  means	  of	  exploring	   the	  extent	   to	  
which	   securitization	   can	  be	   applied	   to	   the	  Middle	   East.	   Such	  an	   approach	  helps	  us	   to	  
identify	   the	   logics	   that	   are	   involved	   within	   the	   process	   of	   securitization,	   with	  
consideration	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  populate	  a	  broad	  framework	  about	  the	  universal	  
application	  of	  securitization	  to	  context	  specific	  cases.	  
	  
There	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  range	  of	  challenges	  to	  the	  application	  of	  securitization	  theories	  to	  
the	   non-­‐Western	   world.	   Whilst	   a	   number	   of	   scholars	   have	   undertaken	   such	   efforts,	  
including	   a	   number	   of	   luminaries	   involved	   within	   this	   volume,	   we	   must	   also	   be	  
conscious	   of	   a	   range	   of	   issues.	   To	   this	   end,	   this	   article	   seeks	   to	   contribute	   to	   these	  
debates	   by	   asking	   to	   what	   extent	   we	   can	   learn	   about	   the	   logics	   of	   securitization,	  
particularly	  within	  the	  non-­‐Western	  context,	  by	  looking	  at	  case	  studies	  from	  the	  Middle	  
East.	   It	   does	   this	   by	   employing	   a	   comparative	   framework,	   based	   upon	   a	   selection	   of	  
most	   similar	   case	   studies.	   Such	   a	   decision	   facilitates	   awareness	   of	   key	   securitization	  
processes	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  whilst	  they	  are	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  processes,	  
the	  selected	  case	  studies	  help	  us	  to	   identify	   the	   logic	   that	   is	   involved	  within	  the	  more	  
dominant	   processes	   of	   securitization	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.	  With	   the	   penetration	   of	   the	  
region	   by	   hegemonic	   powers,	   we	   also	   consider	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   actors	   are	  
involved	   in	   processes	   of	   securitization.	   Given	   this,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   two	  
processes	  of	  securitization	  that:	  1)	  are	  reflective	  of	  regional	  trends	  and	  2)	  that	  share	  a	  
similar	   logic	   of	   securitization,	   working	   across	   levels	   of	   analysis,	   transcending	   state	  
borders.	  To	  facilitate	  this	  analysis	   I	  draw	  upon	  a	  number	  of	  diplomatic	  cables	  released	  
by	  the	  Wikileaks	  organisation.	  Although	  problematic	  ethically,	  they	  offer	  rich	  insight	  into	  
securitization	  attempts,	  which	  would	  not	  be	  otherwise	  possible.	  	  
	  
Debate	   about	   the	   process	   of	   securitization	   has	   become	   a	   central	   tenet	   of	   Security	  
Studies	   and	   International	   Relations	   broadly.	   The	   broadening	   of	   the	   security	   agenda	  
facilitated	   by	   the	   so-­‐called	   Copenhagen	   School	   allowed	   for	   greater	   insight	   into	   the	  
construction	  of	   security	  within	   the	   contemporary	  world.	   This	   article	   does	   not	   seek	   to	  
offer	  an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  securitization	   in	  the	  region,	  which	  have	  
been	   argued	   elsewhere,	   including	   by	   this	   author	   (see	  Mabon,	   2017	   and	   Darwich	   and	  
Fakhoury,	   2016).	   Instead,	  we	  will	   briefly	   reflect	   on	   the	  main	   stages	   of	   the	   processes,	  
before	  populating	  the	  logic	  of	  these	  processes.	  	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  concepts	  that	  must	  be	  noted	  before	  we	  can	  continue	  with	  our	  
exploration.	  As	  Buzan,	  Wæver	  and	  De	  Wild	  argue,	  security	  “is	  about	  survival.	  It	  is	  when	  
an	  issue	  is	  presented	  as	  posing	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  a	  designated	  referent	  object	  [...].	  
The	   special	   nature	   of	   security	   threats	   justifies	   the	   use	   of	   extraordinary	   measures	   to	  
handle	  them	  (Buzan,	  Weaver	  &	  De	  Wild,	  1998:	  21).	  The	  article	  uses	  this	  brief	  definition	  
of	  security	  along	  with	  additional	  developments	  that	  come	  with	  it.	  For	  the	  Buzan,	  Wæver	  
and	  De	  Wild,	  security	  “ultimately	  rests	  neither	  with	  the	  objects	  nor	  with	  the	  subjects	  but	  
among	   the	   subjects.”(Buzan,	  Wæver	   and	  Wilde	   1998:	   31)	   It	   is	   inter-­‐relational	   and	   by	  
identifying	  this	  we	  are	  better	  placed	  to	  understand	  it.	  	  
As	  Greenwood	  and	  Wæver	  articulate,	  the	  concept	  of	  securitization	  is	  rooted	  locally	  –	  as	  
is	   suggested	   by	   its	   ‘nickname’,	   yet	   when	   it	   ‘travels’	   beyond	   the	   West	   a	   number	   of	  
conceptual	  problems	  emerge.	  Perhaps	   the	  most	  powerful	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   in	   the	  post-­‐
colonial	  world,	  concepts	  such	  as	  politics,	   regime-­‐society	   relations,	  and	  sovereignty	  are	  
applied	  to	  contexts	  that	  bear	  little	  resemblance	  to	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  West,	  with	  
vastly	   different	   contents	   (Chaterjee,	   2014).	   A	   prominent	   feature	   of	   the	   securitization	  
move	   is	   that	   normal	   politics	   is	   suspended	   to	   allow	   for	   exceptional	   measures	   to	   be	  
installed,	  but	  normal	  politics	  itself	  is	  a	  problematic	  concept.	  
Of	   course,	   when	   transferred	   across	   different	   contexts,	   definitions	   of	   ‘normal’	   vary	  
greatly,	   yet	   the	   fundamental	   aspect	   of	   such	   a	   concept	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   idea	   of	  
stability.	   As	  Wilkinson	   argues,	   inherent	  within	   securitization	   theory	   is	   the	   assumption	  
that	   “European	   understandings	   of	   society	   and	   the	   state	   are	   universal”	   (2007:5).	   To	  
define	   a	   particular	   context	   as	   having	   the	   characteristics	   of	   normal	   politics,	   we	   must	  
make	  a	  range	  of	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  society,	  about	  political	  situations,	  the	  
role	   of	   religion	   in	   society,	   and	   about	   economic	   factors.	   These	   assumptions	   about	   the	  
structure	   of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   reveal	   the	   hegemonic	   Liberal	   ontology	   within	   the	  
theory.	   Of	   course,	   all	   societies	   do	   have	   rules	   and	   perhaps	   the	   suspension	   of	   normal	  
politics	  involves	  the	  suspension	  of	  particular	  rules	  within	  society.	  	  
The	   process	   of	   securitization	   generates	   sovereignty,	   by	   the	   articulation	   of	   what	   is	  
deemed	   to	   be	   an	   extraordinary	   threat,	   determining	   the	   exception	   –	   and	   sovereignty	  
generates	  securitization	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  concept.	  Sovereignty	  is	  concerned	  
with	   order	   and	   belonging,	   with	   security	   playing	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   efforts	   to	   create	  
order.	  Yet	  as	  securitization	  moves	  take	  place	  across	  sovereign	  boundaries,	  drawing	  upon	  
collective	  histories	  and	  experiences	  to	  provide	  justification,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  we	  can	  refer	  securitization	  as	  a	  linear	  structure	  (Wilkinson,	  2007,12).	  
	  
Building	  upon	  this	  linear	  process,	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  audience,	  to	  whom	  speech	  
acts	  are	  uttered,	  which	  ultimately	  determines	  the	  success	  of	  the	  move	  (Buzan,	  Waever,	  
and	  de	  Wild	  1998,	  25).	  Moreover,	   it	   is	  the	  audience	  that	  provides	  that	  context	  for	  the	  
adoption	  of	  “distinctive	  policies”,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  exceptional	  or	  not	   (Balzacq,	  
Leonard,	  and	  Ruzicka	  2016,	  495).	  Typically,	  audiences	  are	  part	  of	  a	   linear	  process,	   yet	  
when	   moves	   take	   place	   across	   sovereign	   borders	   to	   draw	   upon	   normative	  
environments,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  linear	  processes	  are	  in	  operation.	  
Politics,	  Religion	  and	  Security	  in	  the	  Gulf	  	  
	  
Along	   with	   other	   regions	   of	   the	   world,	   security	   strategies	   in	   the	   Arab	   world	   were	  
predicated	   upon	   a	   “top-­‐down”	   approach	   to	   understanding	   and	   framing	   security,	  
simultaneously	   focusing	   upon	   the	   threats	   from	   external	   and	   internal	   actors.	   As	   such,	  
whilst	  the	  focus	  upon	  security	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  often	  framed	  in	  ‘traditional’	  terms,	  it	  
is	   far	  more	   “unconventional”	   (Bilgin,	   2012),	  with	   a	   strong	   focus	  upon	   regime	   survival,	  
societal	   security,	   and	   ideological	   power.	   In	  many	   cases,	  we	   see	   the	   interaction	  of	   the	  
traditional	   and	   unconventional,	   or	   the	   conflation	   of	   external	   and	   internal	   threats.	   To	  
understand	  how	  this	  occurs	  we	  must	  provide	  some	  brief	  regional	  context.	  
	  
In	  doing	  so,	  we	  must	  provide	  political	  and	   theological	   context	  within	  which	  actors	  are	  
operating.	  The	  prominence	  of	  Islam	  within	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  cannot	  be	  ignored,	  nor	  
can	   its	   role	   in	   the	  political,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  events	  gain	  meaning.	  Within	   the	  Middle	  
East,	  the	  site	  of	  the	  two	  holy	  places	  of	  Islam,	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  within	  both	  daily	  and	  
political	   life	   is	   paramount.	   Religion	   also	   serves	   as	   a	  mechanism	   for	   regimes	   to	   secure	  
their	  legitimacy	  –	  and	  ultimately	  survival	  –	  yet	  this	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  in	  zero	  sum	  terms	  
across	  the	  region.	  As	  such,	  religion	  takes	  on	  an	  existential	   importance,	  as	  a	  prominent	  
feature	  of	  securitization	  discourse,	  particularly	  so	  when	  located	  within	  political	  debates.	  
Before	  we	  turn	  to	  our	  case	  studies,	  we	  must	  then	  provide	  a	  brief	  contextual	  overview	  of	  
the	   regional	   security	  environment,	  which	   serves	   to	  underpin	  many	  of	   the	  perceptions	  
and	  decisions	  that	  are	  made	  by	  actors	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
	  
The	   rivalry	   with	   Iran	   has	   long	   dominated	   the	   security	   calculations	   of	   a	   number	   of	  
prominent	   Sunni	   Arab	   states,	   notably	   Saudi	   Arabia	   (see:	   Mabon,	   2013;	   Mattiessen,	  
2013;	  Furtig,	  2006;	  Chubin	  and	  tripp,	  1996;	  Keynoush,	  2016;	  Mason,	  2104).	  Within	  this	  
context,	  since	  the	  revolution	  of	  1979,	  Islam	  has	  played	  an	  increasingly	  instrumental	  role	  
within	  what	  historically	  was	  a	  geopolitical	  rivalry,	  yet	  the	  Islamic	  rhetoric	  that	  was	  often	  
directed	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Saud	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  
regime	  (Rubin,	  2014).	  Moreover,	  the	  provision	  of	  support	  to	  the	  ‘downtrodden’	  of	  the	  
Muslim	  world	  –	   typically	  held	   to	  be	   Shi’a	  Muslims	  –	  would	  be	  a	   cause	   for	   concern	  as	  
these	   acts	   became	   increasingly	   politicised	   and	   identities	   over	   time	   would	   become	  
securitized	  (Nasr,	  2007).	  With	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  states	  across	  the	  years	  following	  the	  
revolution,	  this	  would	  provide	  space	  and	  sites	  for	  competition,	  vying	  for	  influence.	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  dissonance	  within	  the	  rivalry	  was	  over	  competing	  views	  of	  the	  
US	  within	  the	  region.	  For	  Saudi	  Arabia,	   the	  US	  played	  an	   integral	   role	   in	  ensuring	  that	  
regional	  security	  was	  maintained	  yet	  for	  Iran,	  regional	  security	  should	  be	  maintained	  by	  
those	  operating	  within	  what	  Barry	  Buzan	  termed	  the	  ‘regional	  security	  complex’	  (Buzan,	  
2002).	  Of	  course,	  with	  its	  long	  and	  prestigious	  history	  of	  Persian	  Empire	  and	  conquest,	  
Iran	  was	  ‘uniquely	  qualified’	  to	  provide	  leadership	  over	  the	  Gulf	  region	  and	  to	  ensure	  its	  
stability.	   Differences	   over	   the	   arrangement	   of	   regional	   security	   would	   be	   a	   regular	  
source	  of	  contention,	  during	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War,	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  the	  2003	  invasion	  and	  its	  
aftermath.	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  1979	  revolution,	  the	  regime	  in	  Tehran	  would	  establish	  a	  new	  constitution	  
that	  explicitly	   located	  the	  Shi’a	  experience	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   its	  raison	  d’etre,	  particularly	  
within	   the	   context	   regional	   security	   calculations,	   ushering	   in	   a	   period	   of	   rhetorical	  
enmity	  seeking	  to	  demonstrate	  Islamic	  credentials	  to	  the	  wider	  umma.	  
Such	  comments	  were	  built	  upon	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  the	  perceived	  impropriety	  of	  
the	  Al	  Saud:	  
If	  we	  wanted	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  world	  that	   the	  Saudi	  Government,	   these	  vile	  and	  
ungodly	   Saudis,	   are	   like	   daggers	   that	   have	   always	   pierced	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  
Moslems	   from	   the	  back,	  we	  would	   not	   have	  been	   able	   to	   do	   it	   as	  well	   as	   has	  
been	   demonstrated	   by	   these	   inept	   and	   spineless	   leaders	   of	   the	   Saudi	  
Government.	  (New	  York	  Times,	  1987)	  	  
The	  role	  of	  religion	  within	  the	  fabric	  of	  both	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  means	  that	  religion	  
plays	  an	  undeniably	  prominent	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rivalry	  between	  the	  two	  
regional	   powers.	   Of	   course,	   when	   particular	   incidents	   occur,	   both	   states	   are	   keen	   to	  
frame	   them	   within	   particular	   contexts,	   often	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   other.	   Direct	  
targeting	   is	   also	   a	   prominent	   feature	   of	   the	   strategies	   of	   both	   states.	   Following	   the	  
execution	   of	   the	   Shi’a	   cleric	   Nimr	   al	   Nimr	   in	   January	   2016,	   Ayatollah	   Ali	   Khamenei	  
predicted	  “divine	  vengeance”	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  Sheikh	  Nimr	  (Fatoullah-­‐Nejad,	  2016).	  	  
In	   contrast,	   the	  Al	   Saud	   had	   previously	   framed	   the	   1979	   revolution	   as	   an	   example	   of	  
‘Persian	   expansionism’	   (Furtig,	   2002)	   along	   with	   being	   vocal	   about	   the	   interference	  
within	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  other	  states	  (Mabon,	  2013).	  Indeed,	  prior	  to	  the	  Hajj	  of	  1987,	  
King	  Fahd	  attacked	  the	  “hypocrites	  and	  pretenders	  who	  are	  using	   Islam	  to	  undermine	  
and	  destabilise	  other	  countries”	  (Goldberg,	  1987).	  	  
Regime	  officials	  in	  Tehran	  were	  also	  vocal	  in	  their	  regional	  aspirations	  
We	  will	  export	  our	  experiences	  to	  the	  whole	  world	  and	  present	  the	  outcome	  of	  
our	  struggles	  against	  tyrants	  to	  those	  who	  are	  struggling	  along	  the	  path	  of	  God,	  
without	   expecting	   the	   slightest	   reward.	   The	   result	   of	   this	   exportation	   will	  
certainly	  result	  in	  the	  blooming	  of	  the	  buds	  of	  victory	  and	  independence	  and	  in	  
the	  implementation	  of	  Islamic	  teachings	  among	  the	  enslaved	  nations.	  (New	  York	  
Times,	  1987)	  
The	  politicization	  of	  religion	  and	  increased	  importance	  of	  faith	  within	  foreign	  policies	  of	  
Gulf	  states	  meant	  that	  Islam	  took	  on	  an	  existential	  importance	  for	  regimes	  in	  the	  region.	  
Within	   this	   context	   and	   given	   the	   plurality	   of	   religious	   views	   of	   actors	   with	   political	  
agendas,	  sectarian	  differences	  took	  on	  an	  increasingly	  important	  role	  within	  the	  region,	  
serving	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  divide	  protest	  groups	  and	  maintain	  the	  support	  of	  regional	  allies.	  	  
	  
With	   the	  establishment	  of	  Hizballah,	   the	   Lebanese	  Party	  of	  God,	   in	   1982	   (El	  Husseini,	  
2010)	  and	  support	  for	  the	  Islamic	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Bahrain	  during	  the	  1980s	  
(Alhasan	  2011),	  it	  appeared	  clear	  to	  many	  Gulf	  rulers	  that	  Iran	  was	  putting	  its	  words	  into	  
action.	   In	   1996,	   the	   Khobar	   Towers	   residential	   complex	   was	   bombed,	   allegedly	   by	  
Hizballah	  al-­‐Hijaz	  with	  Iranian	  support	  (Mattiessen,	  2010).	  
	  
In	  the	  post	  Arab	  Uprisings	  Middle	  East,	  a	  number	  of	  states	  have	  been	  characterized	  by	  
serious	   tensions	   between	   regime	   and	   society,	  which	   have	   been	   furthered	   by	   external	  
actors	  (Lynch,	  2016).	  The	  fragmentation	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  (Mabon,	  2017)	  across	  the	  
region	  has	  provided	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  exert	   influence	  across	  the	  
region,	   often	   seen	   in	   zero-­‐sum	   terms.	  One	   such	  way	   that	   influence	   can	  be	  wielded	   is	  
through	  reference	  to	  religious	  narratives,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  both	  the	  prominence	  of	  
religion	   across	   the	   region	   and	   the	   spread	   of	   religious	   identity	   groups.	   Sectarian	  
difference	   across	   the	   region	   leaves	   states	   open	   to	   external	   interference	   within	   state	  
borders	  	  
	  
Amidst	   an	   increasingly	   contested	   region,	   there	   is	   a	   range	   of	   challenges	   to	   regime	  
security,	  which	  erupted	  in	  2011	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  protest	  groups.	  The	  protestors	  raised	  
concerns	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   political	   systems	   across	   the	   Middle	   East,	   along	   with	  
demographic	   issues,	   economic	   factors	   and	   endemic	   corruption.	   Protests	   and	   counter	  
protests	  followed	  as	  regimes	  and	  protestors	  sought	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  a	  
range	  of	   tactics	  were	  used	  to	  this	  end.	  One	  such	  tactic	  was	  to	  strengthen	  the	  support	  
base	  of	  the	  regime,	  achieved	  by	  securitizing	  a	  particular	  group.	  The	  decision	  to	  securitize	  
actors,	  as	  a	   tool	  of	   solidification,	  would	  provoke	  serious	  divisions	  between	  protestors,	  
changing	  the	  nature	  of	  protest	  movements	  and	  framing	  issues	  within	  broader	  regional	  
dynamics.	  
	  
In	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings,	  regimes	  across	  the	  Middle	  East,	  threatened	  by	  
the	   emergence	   of	   protest	   groups	   across	   the	   region,	   sought	   to	   ensure	   their	   survival.	  
Regimes	  utilised	  a	  number	  of	  strategies,	  ranging	  from	  political	  reform	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
in	   an	   attempt	   to	   remove	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   opposition	   groups.	   In	   engaging	   in	   such	  
practices,	   regimes	  marginalised	   particular	   groups	   from	   civil	   society	   and,	   in	   doing	   this,	  
the	  geopolitical	  environment	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  began	  to	  shift.	  The	  severity	  of	  the	  
threat	  facing	  largely	  autocratic	  regimes	  across	  the	  region	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  and	  
caused	   Saudi	   Arabia	   –	   amongst	   others	   –	   to	  mobilize	   strategies	   to	   stave	   off	   domestic	  
unrest,	  whilst	   aligning	   externally	   to	  maintain	   regional	   influence.	   The	   fragmentation	  of	  
states	  across	   the	  region	  would	  provide	  scope	   for	   increased	   interference	   from	  external	  
states	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  increase	  their	  geopolitical	  standing.	  
	  
When	  coupled	  with	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  region,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  states	  across	  
the	  Middle	  East	  would	  increase	  concerns	  amongst	  Sunni	  Gulf	  states	  that	  Tehran	  would	  
seek	  to	  increase	  its	  influence	  with	  Shi’a	  groups.	  To	  counter	  this,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  GCC	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  ties	  across	  the	  organisation,	  along	  with	  other	  
Arab	  monarchies,	  with	  whom	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  characteristics	  are	  shared.	  Saudi	  Arabia	  
also	  attempted	  to	  reduce	  Iranian	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  by	  supporting	  Syrian	  opposition	  
groups	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   topple	   Bashar	   al	   Assad,	   a	   long-­‐standing	   ally	   of	   Tehran	   (Al	  
Rasheed,	  2012).	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	  manipulation	  of	   events	   in	   fragmenting	   states,	   Saudi	  Arabia	  had	  also	  
sought	   to	   securitize	   the	   Iranian	   threat	   to	   actors	   in	   the	   US	   (Mabon,	   2017b),	   yet	  
Washington’s	   reluctance	   to	   suspend	   ‘normal	   politics’	   would	   provoke	   Riyadh	   to	   think	  
carefully	  about	   its	  ability	   to	   rely	  on	  Washington	  as	  a	   security	  guarantor.	  Domestically,	  
Saudi	   Arabia	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   quiet	   reformer,	   offering	   a	   large	   economic	   package	   to	  
placate	   domestic	   unrest	  whilst	   slowly	   embarking	   on	   a	   programme	  of	   reform	   (Mabon,	  
2012b),	  albeit	  on	  pre-­‐decided	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  politics.	  Riyadh	  also	  
sought	  to	  diversify	   its	  economy	  away	  from	  reliance	  upon	  natural	  resources,	  yet	  such	  a	  
move	  is	  in	  its	  infancy	  and	  could	  result	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  tensions	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  
the	  Saudi	  state,	  with	  its	  Wahhabi	  clerics.	  Yet	  such	  tensions	  are	  for	  another	  article.	  
	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  exogenous	  factors,	  the	  rivalry	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  
and	   Iran	  became	   increasingly	   fractious	   following	   the	   invasion	  of	   Iraq.	   In	   the	   following	  
decade,	   distrust	   and	   enmity	   became	  defining	   characteristics	   of	   the	   rivalry,	  which	  was	  
then	   exacerbated	   by	   opportunities	   presented	   by	   the	   Arab	   Uprisings	   and	   the	  
fragmentation	   of	   regime-­‐society	   relations.	   Independent	   of	   the	   uprisings,	   negotiations	  
between	  the	  P5+1	  and	  Iran	  were	  underway	  to	  resolve	  the	  Iranian	  nuclear	  crisis,	  and	  the	  
agreement	  would	  increase	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  concerns	  about	  the	  ramifications	  of	  galvanized	  
Iran,	  emboldened	  by	  the	  burgeoning	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  international	  community.	  
By	   considering	   two	   cases	   of	   securitization	   we	   are	   well	   placed	   to	   reflect	   conceptually	  
upon	  processes	  of	  securitization	  in	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world,	  but	  also	  upon	  the	  changing	  
nature	  of	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  security	  environment.	  	  
Case	  Study	  1:	  The	  Iranian	  ‘Threat’	  	  
	  
The	  Threat	  from	  Iran	  
	  
Our	   first	  case	  study	  allows	  us	   to	  consider	  how	  regimes	  have	  sought	   to	  cultivate	  –	  and	  
maintain	  –	  support	  from	  regional	  actors,	  by	  focussing	  upon	  the	  securitization	  of	  Iran	  in	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  US	  led	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  establishment	  
of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	   in	  1979	  would	  dramatically	  alter	  regional	  relations	  and	  security	  
calculations	  within	  many	  Sunni	  states,	  particularly	  those	  who	  possessed	  a	  Shi’a	  minority	  
notably	  Bahrain,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Kuwait.	  	  In	  2003,	  regional	  relations	  would	  be	  altered	  
once	  again,	  with	  the	  toppling	  of	  the	  Ba’athist	  regime	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	  in	  Iraq,	  leaving	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  as	  the	  two	  regional	  hegemons,	  seeking	  to	  shape	  the	  region	  in	  their	  
image	  (Mabon,	  2013).	  At	  this	  time,	  Iraq	  had	  begun	  to	  fragment,	  leaving	  groups	  open	  to	  
increasing	  influence	  from	  both	  states,	  however,	  given	  the	  shared	  religious	  ties	  between	  
Iran	  and	  the	  Shi’a	  majority	   in	   Iraq,	  coupled	  with	  the	  assistance	  historically	  provided	  to	  
Shi’a	  actors	  from	  Iraq	  under	  the	  Ba’athists,	  Iranian	  influence	  increased	  dramatically	  (see	  
Tripp,	   2007	   and	   Haddad,	   2013).	   At	   this	   time,	   Riyadh	   sought	   to	   counter	   Tehran’s	  
burgeoning	  influence,	  building	  links	  both	  with	  regional	  states	  and	  the	  US,	  predominantly	  
by	  attempting	  to	  securitize	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Iran.	  	  
	  
Despite	  a	  burgeoning	  rapprochement	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  over	  the	  previous	  
decade	  (Furtig,	  2002),	  increased	  hostilities	  between	  the	  two	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  Iraq	  
as	   an	   area	   of	   uncertainty	   –	   and	   later	   an	   arena	   of	   competition	   –	   would	   result	   in	   a	  
dramatic	   shift	   in	   regional	   security	   calculations	   amongst	   Gulf	   states.	   The	   spread	   of	  
religious	   minorities	   across	   the	   region,	   coupled	   with	   the	   complexity	   of	   security	  
calculations	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   meant	   that	   security	   would	   become	   a	   prominent	   feature	   of	  
politics	  broadly.	  Within	  this	  process,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  would	  frame	  Iran	  as	  a	  serious	  threat	  
to	  regional	  security,	  directed	  at	  domestic,	  regional	  and	  international	  audiences.	  	  
Regional	  Security	  Concerns	  as	  Facilitating	  Conditions	  
	  
Such	   efforts	   to	   designate	   Iran	   as	   an	   existential	   threat	   emerge	   from	   both	   historical	  
memory	  and	  contemporary	  events.	  The	  Islamic	  Republic’s	  behaviour	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	   revolution	   had	   created	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   suspicion	   about	   Tehran’s	   intentions	   across	  
the	  Middle	   East,	   which	   became	   particularly	   prominent	   as	   state	   sovereignty	   began	   to	  
fragment.	  Concern	  at	   Iranian	  support	  for	  Shi’a	  groups	  across	  the	  region	  was	  becoming	  
widespread.	  King	  Abdullah	  of	  Jordan,	  referred	  to	  a	  ‘Shi’a	  Crescent’	  (NBC	  2008),	  wherein	  
Shi’a	  populations	  across	  the	  region	  (mapped	  out	   in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  crescent)	  were	  fifth	  
columns	  doing	  the	  bidding	  of	  Iran.	  
	  	  	  
Reflecting	  the	  growing	  power	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  after	  the	  2003	  invasion	  and	  alignment	  of	  
Sunni	   Arab	   states	   and	   monarchies	   behind	   it,	   it	   was	   Riyadh	   that	   was	   able	   to	   best	  
withstand	  geopolitical	  pressures	  and	  harness	  them	  to	  its	  advantage.	  Saudi	  Arabia	  would	  
look	   to	  harness	   the	  currents	  of	   the	  uprisings	  and	  direct	   them	   in	   the	  direction	  of	   their	  
national	   interest.	   Framing	   events	   along	   sectarian	   lines,	   as	   Riyadh	   would	   seek	   to	   do,	  
provided	  states	  with	   the	  opportunity	   to	   frame	  uprisings	  within	   the	  context	  of	  broader	  
geopolitical	   trends	   and	   with	   it,	   to	   discredit	   democratic	   and	   economic	   concerns.	  
Ultimately,	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  two	  sets	  of	  actions:	  
the	  first,	  to	  mobilise	  a	  collective	  initially	  under	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  GCC	  to	  ensure	  the	  
survival	   of	   monarchical	   regimes	   across	   the	   region,	   and	   second,	   to	   respond	   to	   fears	  
about	   Iranian	   penetration	   of	   a	   fragmenting	   region,	   resulting	   in	   the	   solidification	   of	  
geopolitical	  alliances.	   In	  both	  cases,	  while	  other	  states	  also	  acted	   in	  response	  to	  these	  
concerns,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  would	  take	  the	  lead.	  
	   	  
At	  this	  time,	  one	  can	  easily	  see	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Saudi	  Arabia	  sought	  to	  frame	  Iran	  as	  
an	   existential	   threat	   to	   regional	   security.	   US	   diplomatic	   cables	   (later	   released	   by	  
Wikileaks)	  recall	  the	  extent	  of	  Riyadh’s	  paranoia	  at	  increased	  Iranian	  influence:	  
	  
The	   King	   said	   he	   had	   “no	   confidence	  whatsoever	   in	   (Iraqi	   PM)	  Maliki,	   and	   the	  
Ambassador	   (Fraker)	   is	  well	   aware	   of	  my	   views”.	   […]	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   King	  
said,	  Maliki	  had	  no	  credibility.	  “I	  don’t	  trust	  this	  man,”	  the	  King	  stated,	  He’s	  an	  
Iranian	   agent.”	   […]	  Maliki	   has	   “opened	   the	   door	   for	   Iranian	   influence	   in	   Iraq”	  
since	  taking	  power,	  the	  King	  said.	  (09RIYADH447_a	  2009)	  
	  
Saudi	   Prince	   Nayif	   bin	   Abdul	   Aziz	   also	   sought	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  
American	   presence	   in	   Iraq,	   calling	   upon	   Washington	   not	   to	   “leave	   Iraq	   until	   its	  
sovereignty	   has	   been	   restored,	   otherwise	   it	   will	   be	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   Iranians’”	  
(06RIYADH9175_a).	   A	   later	   cable	   demonstrated	   the	   extent	   of	   Tehran’s	   ‘penetration’	   of	  
Iraq	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  “Iranian	  City	  of	  Basrah”	  (08BAGHDAD239_a	  2008).	  
	  
One	  consequence	  of	  Iranian	  penetration	  was	  to	  erode	  faith	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  political	  system,	  
amidst	  suggestions	  that	  the	  Maliki	  regime	  lacked	  credibility	  and	  autonomy:	  
	  
The	   King	   said	   he	   had	   “no	   confidence	  whatsoever	   in	   (Iraqi	   PM)	  Maliki,	   and	   the	  
Ambassador	   (Fraker)	   is	  well	   aware	   of	  my	   views”.	   […]	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   King	  
said,	  Maliki	  had	  no	  credibility.	  “I	  don’t	  trust	  this	  man,”	  the	  King	  stated,	  He’s	  an	  
Iranian	   agent.”	   […]	  Maliki	   has	   “opened	   the	   door	   for	   Iranian	   influence	   in	   Iraq”	  
since	  taking	  power,	  the	  King	  said.	  (09RIYADH447_a	  2009)	  
This	   sentiment	  was	   also	   shared	  by	  others,	   showing	   the	   lengths	   to	  which	   Saudi	  Arabia	  
attempted	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   Iran.	   	   A	   later	   cable	   recalled	   a	  
conversation	  between	  the	  Saudi	  ambassador	  to	  the	  US,	  Adel	  Al	  Jubeir	  and	  the	  Charge,	  
wherein	  Al	  Jubeir	  recalled	  a	  conversation	  to	  suspend	  ‘normal	  politics’:	  	  
the	  King's	  frequent	  exhortations	  to	  the	  US	  to	  attack	  Iran	  and	  so	  put	  an	  end	  to	  its	  
nuclear	  weapons	  program.	   	   "He	   told	  you	   to	  cut	  off	   the	  head	  of	   the	  snake,"	  he	  
recalled	   to	   the	   Charge',	   adding	   that	   working	   with	   the	   US	   to	   roll	   back	   Iranian	  
influence	   in	   Iraq	   is	   a	   strategic	   priority	   for	   the	   King	   and	   his	   government.	  
(08RIYADH649_a	  2008)	  	  
	  
Diplomatic	  cables	  also	  noted	  concern	  about	  the	  influence	  that	  Iranian	  supported	  militias	  
had	  across	  Iraq,	  stemming,	  in	  part,	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  financial	  support	  (Mabon	  and	  
Royle,	   2017).	  At	   this	   time	   the	   level	   of	   sectarian	   violence	   increased	   dramatically,	   with	  
casualties	   occurring	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   fighting	   between	   coalition	   forces,	   Al	   Qa’ida	  
affiliates,	   government	   actors,	  militias	   (Sunni	   and	   Shi’a)	   and	   tribal	   groups	   (Mabon	   and	  
Royle,	  2017).	  Such	  concerns	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  Iraq	  and	  included	  Bahrain,	  Yemen	  and	  
Syria.	   In	   a	   meeting	   of	   the	   Organisation	   of	   Islamic	   Co-­‐Operation,	   a	   communiqué	   was	  
issued	  condemning	  “Iran’s	  interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  States	  of	  the	  region	  
and	   other	   Member	   States	   (including	   Bahrain,	   Yemen	   and	   Syria	   and	   Somalia)	   and	   its	  
continued	  support	  for	  terrorism”	  (OIC,	  2016).	  
Audiences	  and	  Success	  
	  
From	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  threat	  and	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  such	  
moves,	   it	   is	   clear	   to	   see	   that	   a	   number	   of	   audiences	   were	   involved	   in	   securitization	  
moves	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   analysis.	   Recognition	   of	   shared	   normative	   environments	  
across	   state	   borders	   offers	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   for	   securitization	   processes.	   Such	  
environments	  are	  found	  through	  exploration	  of	  shared	  religious	  values	  across	  the	  Gulf	  
and	  wider	  Middle	  East.	  They	  are	  also	  found	  with	  regard	  to	  perceptions	  as	  to	  the	  threat	  
posed	  by	   Iran	  and	  as	  such,	  by	  framing	   Iran	  as	  a	  threat	  Saudi	  securitization	  efforts	  also	  
speak	  to	  Israelis,	  those	  previously	  involved	  in	  the	  nuclear	  negotiations,	  and	  particularly	  
the	  US.	  Of	  course,	  these	  two	  different	  approaches	  can	  –	  and	  do	  –	  overlap.	  	  
	  
At	   a	   domestic	   level,	   securitization	  moves	   are	   designed	   to	   speak	   to	   the	   general	   Saudi	  
citizens,	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  whom	  are	  Sunni	  (around	  40%	  of	  whom	  are	  Wahhabi).	  Such	  
comments	   are	   also	   aimed	   at	   the	   Wahhabi	   ulemma,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   maintain	   their	  
loyalty	   and	   to	  placate	  any	   concerns	   about	  deep-­‐seated	   tensions	  between	   the	  Al	   Saud	  
and	   clerics.	   Indeed,	   a	   vehement	   anti-­‐Shi’a	   sentiment	   borne	   out	   of	   deep	   doctrinal	  
differences	  is	  inherent	  within	  Wahhabi	  thought,	  seen	  in	  a	  fatwa	  calling	  upon	  the	  Shi’a	  to	  
convert	  to	  Islam	  (Tietelbaum,	  p2).	  Such	  views	  impact	  upon	  both	  domestic	  and	  regional	  
politics.	   Regionally,	   (the	   perception	   of)	   rising	   Iranian	   influence	   has	   ramifications	   for	  
security	  calculations	   for	  Sunni	  states	  with	  Shi’a	  minorities,	  who	  are	  often	  perceived	  to	  
be	  5th	  columns.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  such	  groups	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  
the	  state,	  both	  domestically	  and	  regionally	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  alleged	  links	  to	  Iran.	  	  
	  
Internationally,	  efforts	  to	  securitize	  the	  Iranian	  threat	  to	  US	  audiences	  demonstrate	  the	  
importance	   of	   the	   US	   for	   Saudi	   Arabia’s	   security.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   speech	   acts	  
document	  above,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  also	  sponsored	  a	  number	  of	  think	  tanks	  and	  universities	  
in	   the	   US	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   favourable	   narrative	   and	   environment	   for	  
securitization	  moves	   to	   find	   traction	   (Fisher,	   2016).	  Whilst	   the	  Obama	   administration	  
did	  not	  strike	  against	   Iranian	  targets,	  we	  must	  consider	  that	  another	  understanding	  of	  
the	   suspension	   of	   normal	   politics	   has	   fed	   into	   conditions	   that	   have	   left	   the	   Trump	  
administration	   able	   to	   question	   the	   vitality	   of	   the	   nuclear	   deal.	   They	   also	   build	   upon	  
long-­‐standing	   Israeli	   efforts	   to	   securitize	   Iran,	   once	   again,	   stressing	   the	   complexity	   of	  
securitization	   moves	   and	   their	   non-­‐linear	   dimensions.	   It	   has	   also	   facilitated	   the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  burgeoning	  relationship	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Israel,	  around	  shared	  
visions	  of	  regional	  security.	  
	  
Case	  Study	  2:	  The	  Shi’a	  of	  Bahrain	  	  
	  
We	  shall	  deport	  them	  to	  Howar,	  Jenan	  and	  Noon	  islands	  ...	  	  
With	  a	  shining	  and	  sharp	  sword	  	  
We’ll	  spill	  their	  bloods	  until	  they	  all	  die	  ...	  
We’ll	  stop	  their	  annual	  processions	  in	  the	  streets	  
As	  their	  poems	  hurl	  insults	  at	  us	  1	  
	  
The	  Threat	  from	  Iran	  and	  the	  Threat	  from	  Within	  
	  
The	  second	  of	  our	  case	  studies	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  on	  the	  
island	  of	   Bahrain,	   home	   to	   a	   Shi’a	  majority	   ruled	  by	   a	   Sunni	  minority.	   Situated	   in	   the	  
Persian	  Gulf	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran,	  Bahrain	  is	  seen	  by	  many	  to	  be	  the	  epicentre	  
of	  the	  Middle	  East’s	  sectarian	  competition.	   In	  the	  years	  after	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	   it	  has	  
been	   a	   site	   of	   competition	   between	   a	   range	   of	   different	   actors	   seeking	   to	   shape	   the	  
future	  of	  Bahrain,	  seemingly	  along	  sectarian	  lines	  yet	  with	  clear	  political	  agendas.	  	  
	  
On	   February	   14th,	   protests	   began	   in	   Bahrain,	   as	   huge	   numbers	   of	   people	   took	   to	   the	  
streets	   protesting	   against	   the	  Al	   Khalifa	   run	  political	   system.	  Comprised	  of	   a	   range	  of	  
different	  groups	  and	  members	  of	  different	  sects,	   in	  possession	  of	  multifarious	  desired	  
outcomes,	   the	   protests	   gained	   international	   attention.	   Shortly	   after,	   Saudi-­‐led	   forces	  
under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  GCC	  crossed	  the	  King	  Fahd	  causeway	  and	  entered	  Bahrain	  to	  
ensure	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   ruling	   Al	   Khalifa	   regime.	   Between	   April	   and	  October	   2011,	  
more	   than	   500	   people	   were	   convicted	   of	   crimes	   against	   the	   state	   and	   prominent	  
members	  of	  leading	  opposition	  parties	  were	  also	  arrested	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2012).	  
Amidst	   this	   unrest	   and	   the	   spate	   of	   arrests	   were	   regular	   allegations	   at	   Iranian	  
involvement	  in	  orchestrating	  the	  protests.	  
	  
Politics	  –	  defined	  broadly	  –	  in	  Bahrain	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  asabiyyah	  (kinship)	  
and	   al-­‐din	   (religious	   principles)	   (Khaldoun,	   1958)	   and	   its	   location	   results	   in	   a	   strong	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Prose	  written	  by	  Khalid	  bin	  Ahmad	  Al	  Khalifa	  in	  1995.	  Cited	  in	  Gengler	  (2013).	  	  	  
history	   of	   trade	   driven	   immigration	   (Fuccaro,	   2009).	   Such	   conditions	   have	   created	   a	  
vibrant	  and	  multifarious	  society,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  different	   identities	  playing	  out	   in	  civil	  
society.	  This	  melange	  of	  identity	  groups	  –	  with	  their	  own	  set	  of	  complex	  histories	  with	  
state	   structures	   (Khuri,	  1980)	  –	  has	  created	   the	  perception	  of	  external	   involvement	   in	  
driving	  particular	  agendas,	  best	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Shi’a,	  who	  are	  seen	  by	  many	  as	  
an	   Iranian	   5th	   column,	   a	   term	   initially	   coined	   by	   King	   Abdullah	   of	   Jordan	   reflecting	  
concerns	   about	   Iran’s	   capacity	   to	   influence	   Shi’a	   groups	   across	   the	  Middle	   East	   (NBC,	  
2008	  and	  06RIYADH3312	  2006).	  	  
Facilitating	  Conditions	  
	  
In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Arab	  Uprisings	   the	   Al	   Khalifa	   regime	   attempted	   to	   frame	   the	  
protest	   movements	   as	   part	   of	   an	   Iranian	   strategy	   to	   create	   uncertainty	   across	   the	  
region.	  Despite	  the	  BICI	  finding	  no	  evidence	  of	  Iranian	  involvement,	  the	  regime	  line	  was	  
to	   stress	   Iranian	   manipulation	   of	   Shi’a	   populations.	   Shi’a	   experiences	   in	   Bahrain	   are	  
multifarious,	   shaped	  by	   a	   range	  of	  other	   factors,	   including	   class,	   gender	   and	  ethnicity	  
(Gengler,	   2013).	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   decades	   of	   political,	   social	   and	   economic	  
repression	   by	   the	   Sunni	  minority,	   the	   Islamic	   Front	   for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Bahrain	  was	  
created	  in	  Bahrain,	  with	  support	  from	  Iranian	  agents.	  The	  group	  would	  attempt	  a	  coup	  
d’etat	   against	   the	   Al	   Khalifa	   regime	   in	   1981,	   having	   been	   trained	   and	   funded	   by	   the	  
Iranian	   Revolutionary	   Guards	   Corps	   (Alhasan	   2011).	   Although	   unsuccessful,	   the	   coup	  
created	  a	   legacy	  of	  external	  –	   Iranian	  –	   interference	   in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  Bahrain	  
and	  as	  such,	  any	  unrest	  within	  Shi’a	  groups	  was	  immediately	  framed	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	  Iranian	  manipulation.	  	  
	  
A	  former	  US	  ambassador	  to	  Bahrain	  would	  describe	  the	  situation	  thus:	  	  
For	   the	   government	   and	   ruling	   family,	   the	   existential	   threat	   is	   Iran	   and	   its	   historical	  
claims	   to	   Bahrain.	   	   Iran's	   increased	   aggressiveness	   under	   President	   Ahmadinejad,	  
coupled	  with	  perceived	  Iranian	  inroads	  in	  Iraq,	  have	  only	  heightened	  Bahraini	  concerns.	  
The	  government	   is	  only	  too	  happy	  to	  have	  us	  focus	  on	  potential	  threats	  from	  Iran	  and	  
their	  alleged	  Shia	  allies	  in	  Bahrain.	  In	  contrast,	  Sunnis,	  even	  Sunni	  extremists,	  form	  the	  
base	   of	   support	   against	   a	   potential	   Shia/Iranian	   threat.	   	   The	   government	   fully	  
understands	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  terror	  attack	  by	  Sunni	  extremists	  in	  Bahrain	  -­‐-­‐	  against	  U.S.	  
or	  Bahraini	   interests	   -­‐-­‐	  would	  be	   a	  disaster	   for	   the	   country	   and	   its	   economy,	   and	   it	   is	  
ready	   to	   cooperate	   with	   us	   fully	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   doesn't	   happen.	   But	   our	   future	  
cooperation	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  two	  factors:	  Bahraini	  confidence	  that,	  in	  this	  
small	   island	   country,	   the	   authorities	   can	   stay	   one	   step	   ahead	   of	   and	   deal	   with	   any	  
extremists	   planning	   a	   local	   operation;	   and	   Bahraini	   reluctance	   to	   move	   against	   or	  
alienate	  the	  Sunni	   Islamist	  community	  at	  a	  time	  of	  heightened	  concern	  about	  Iran	  and	  
rising	  Shia	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  (07MANAMA669_a	  2007).	  
Such	   comments	   stress	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   Iran.	  When	   placed	   within	  
broader	   regional	   dynamics,	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   regional	   security	   and	   fragile	  
demographic	  balance	  in	  Bahrain	  become	  increasingly	  intertwined.	  
	  
Iranian	  press	  outlets	  would	  further	  such	  concerns,	  as	  newspapers	  such	  as	  Kayhan	  would	  
suggest	  that	  
Bahrain	   is	   a	   special	   case	   among	  GCC	   countries	   in	   the	   Persian	  Gulf	   because	   Bahrain	   is	  
part	   of	   the	   Iranian	   territories	   and	   had	   been	   separated	   from	   Iran	   in	   light	   of	   an	   illegal	  
settlement	   between	   the	   executed	   Shah	   an	   the	   governments	   of	   the	  United	   States	   and	  
Britain.	  	  And	  the	  main	  demand	  for	  the	  Bahrain	  people	  is	  to	  return	  its	  province	  -­‐-­‐	  which	  
was	  separated	  from	  Iran	  -­‐-­‐	  to	  the	  motherland	  which	  is	  Islamic	  Iran.	  	  It	  is	  self-­‐evident	  that	  
Iran	   and	   the	   people	   of	   this	   separated	   province	   must	   not	   give	   up	   this	   ultimate	   right	  
(07MANAMA650_a).	  
These	  remarks	  would	  fuel	  suspicion	  of	  Iranian	  manipulation,	  providing	  additional	  scope	  
to	  speak	  to	  three	  different	  audiences.	  	  
	  
Shi’a	   experiences	   in	   Bahrain	   are	   largely	   intersectional,	   shaped	   by	   political	   dynamics	  
across	  the	  archipelago,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  regional	  dynamics,	  stemming	  from	  
shared	   religious	   experiences	   across	   the	   region.	   An	   unpublished	   report	   for	   the	   Gulf	  
Centre	  for	  Democratic	  Development	  noted	  how	  
the	  marginalization	  of	  Sunnīs	  and	  the	  lessening	  of	  their	  role	  in	  Bahrain	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  
regional	  problem,	  whereas	  [our]	  sons	  of	  the	  Sunnī	  sect	   in	   Iraq	  face	  the	  same	  problem,	  
meaning	   there	   is	   a	   direct	   correlation	   between	   [the	   Iraqi	   situation	   and]	   the	  
marginalization	  of	  the	  Sunna	  in	  the	  Gulf	  countries,	  and	  their	  marginalization	  in	  Bahrain	  
in	  particular.	  Thus	  there	  is	  a	  dangerous	  challenge	  facing	  Bahraini	  society	  in	  the	  increased	  
role	   of	   the	   Shīʿa	   [and]	   the	   retreat	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Sunna	   in	   the	   Bahraini	   political	  
system;	  namely,	   the	  problem	  concerns	   the	  country’s	   [Bahrain’s]	  national	   security,	   and	  
the	   likelihood	   of	   political	   regime	   change	   in	   the	   long	   term	   by	   means	   of	   the	   current	  
relationships	   between	   Bahrain’s	   Shīʿa	   and	   all	   the	   Shīʿa	   in	   Iran,	   Iraq,	   Saudi	   Arabia’s	  
eastern	  region,	  and	  Kuwait	  (Gengler	  2013).	  
The	  fusion	  of	  political	  and	  religious	  identities	  became	  increasingly	  prominent	  and	  amidst	  
changing	  regional	  dynamics,	  became	  framed	  as	  a	  security	  threat.	  
	  
As	  Justin	  Gengler	  argues,	  the	  Al	  Khalifa	  strategy	  had	  three	  dimensions:	  The	  first	  was	  to	  
exclude	   the	   Shi’a	   from	  prominent	  ministries	   and	   security	   services;	   the	   second	  was	   to	  
dilute	   demographic	   influence	   of	   Shi’a	   citizens;	   while	   the	   third	   was	   to	   mobilize	   Sunni	  
against	   Shi’a	   to	   ensure	   the	   vitality	   of	   the	   support	   basis	   (Gengler	   2013).	   There	   is,	  
however,	   a	   fourth	   aspect	   that	   is	   explored	   below,	   notably	  with	   regard	   to	   securing	   the	  
support	  of	  external	  audiences.	  
	  
Throughout	   this	   process,	   the	   King	  was	   vocal	   in	   expressing	   his	   suspicion	   about	   Iranian	  
action	   and	   intent,	   alongside	   the	   potential	   for	   Tehran	   to	   incite	   unrest	   amongst	   Shi’a	  
communities	   in	  Bahrain.	   In	  conversation	  with	  the	  US	  ambassador,	  King	  Hamad	  argued	  
that	   “as	   long	   as	   Khamenei	   has	   the	   title	   of	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief,	   Bahrain	   must	   worry	  
about	   the	   loyalty	  of	  Shia	  who	  maintain	   ties	  and	  allegiance	  to	   Iran”	   (06MANAMA409_a).	  
Fawaz	  bin	  Mohammed	  Al	  Khalifa,	   the	  Bahraini	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UK,	  argued	  that	  the	  
Iranian	  threat	  was	  greater	  than	  that	  posed	  by	  Da’ish.	  Moreover,	  he	  also	  condemned	  the	  
“expansionist	  ambitions	  of	  the	  Persian	  Shia	  establishment”,	  who	  he	  blamed	  for	  unrest	  in	  
Bahrain,	  Lebanon,	  Kuwait	  and	  Yemen	  (Al	  Khalifa	  2016).	  
Audiences	  and	  Success	  
Once	  again,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  Al	  Khalifa’s	  securitization	  efforts	   involved	  speaking	  to	  
audiences	   at	   different	   levels,	  with	   different	   goals	   in	  mind.	  At	   a	   domestic	   level,	   the	  Al	  
Khalifa	  sought	  to	  divide	  protest	  groups	  along	  sectarian	  lines	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  to	  defuse	  
demands	   for	   political	   reform.	   By	   framing	   the	   protests	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   Iranian	  
manipulation,	   the	   regime	  hoped	  to	  ensure	   the	   loyalty	  of	  Sunni	  Arabs,	  who	  had	  a	   long	  
history	   of	   suspicion	   directed	   at	   their	   Persian	   Gulf	   neighbours.	   Allegations	   at	   Iranian	  
involvement	   in	   the	  unrest	   in	  Bahrain	  were	  not	   limited	  to	  Bahraini	  officials;	   rather,	   the	  
British	   ambassador	   was	   also	   keen	   to	   stress	   Iranian	   involvement,	   along	   with	   embassy	  
officials,	  who	  also	  suggested	   Iranian	  complicity	   in	   the	  development	  of	  a	  bomb-­‐making	  
factory	  in	  2013.2	  
	  
The	  main	  target	  of	  these	  securitization	  efforts	   is	  twofold.	  First,	  to	  domestic	  audiences,	  
where	  separating	  Sunni	  and	  Shi’a	  protestors	  whilst	   limiting	  Shi’a	   influence	  archipelago	  
was	  paramount	  (Bahrain	  Mirror	  2015).	  Second,	  the	  Al	  Khalifa	  also	  sought	  to	  ensure	  the	  
continued	  support	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia,	   regional	  allies,	  and	  ultimately	   the	  US.	  At	   this	   time,	  
Saudi	   Arabia	   had	   continued	   a	   process	   of	   securitization,	   publishing	   opinion	   pieces	   in	  
Western	   news	  outlets.	   Al	   Jubeir,	   the	   Saudi	   Foreign	  Minister	   stressed	   that	   Iran	  was	   to	  
blame	   for	   regional	   unrest,	   and	   that	   Tehran	   attempted	   to	   “obscure	   its	   dangerous	  
sectarian	   and	   expansionist	   policies,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   support	   for	   terrorism,	   by	   leveling	  
unsubstantiated	  charges	  against	   the	  Kingdom	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia”	   (Al	   Jubeir	  2016).	  For	  Al	  
Jubeir,	   “the	   single-­‐most-­‐belligerent-­‐actor	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   its	   actions	   display	   both	   a	  
commitment	   to	   regional	   hegemony	   and	   a	   deeply	   held	   view	   that	   conciliatory	   gestures	  
signal	  weakness	  either	  on	  Iran’s	  part	  or	  on	  the	  part	  of	  its	  adversaries”	  (Al	  Jubeir,	  2016).	  
By	   supporting	   this	   narrative,	   Bahrain	   was	   ensuring	   the	   continued	   support	   of	   Saudi	  
Arabia,	  placing	  it	  at	  the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  struggle	  against	  Iranian	  expansionism.	  Manama	  
was	  also	  seeking	  to	  erode	  US	  and	  Western	  criticism	  at	  its	  handling	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  
in	  2011.	  The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  uprisings	  continued	  amidst	  seemingly	  endemic	  structural	  
violence	  aimed	  at	  Shi’a	  groups	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  political	  agency.	  
The	   process	   was	   also	   aimed	   at	  Western	   audiences,	   whose	   presence	   in	   Bahrain	   drew	  
unwanted	  attention	  to	  the	  repressive	  nature	  of	  the	  post-­‐uprisings	  landscape.	  In	  support	  
of	   this,	  a	  number	  of	  PR	  companies	  were	  hired	  by	  the	  Al	  Khalifa	  to	   improve	  this	   image	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2Interviews	  with	  British	  and	  American	  officials,	  Manama	  and	  London,	  2013.	  
(Bahrain	  Watch,	  Azizi,	  2012)	  whilst	  celebrities	  were	  also	  paid	  to	  tweet	  about	  their	  visits	  
to	  the	  island	  (Kardashian,	  2012).	  
In	   spite	   of	   this,	   a	   number	   of	   people	   were	   not	   convinced.	   For	   US	   President	   Barack	  
Obama,	  	  
The	   only	   way	   forward	   is	   for	   the	   government	   and	   opposition	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  
dialogue,	   and	   you	   can't	   have	   a	   real	   dialogue	   when	   parts	   of	   the	   peaceful	  
opposition	  are	   in	   jail.	  The	  government	  must	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  dialogue,	  
and	   the	   opposition	   must	   participate	   to	   forge	   a	   just	   future	   for	   all	   Bahrainis	  
(Reuters,	  2011).	  
Obama	   later	   called	   on	   the	   government	   and	   the	  main	   opposition	   groups	   “to	   pursue	   a	  
meaningful	   dialogue	   that	   brings	   peaceful	   change	   that	   is	   responsive	   to	   the	   people.”	  
(White	  House,	  2011)	  Shortly	  after,	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  stressed	  that	  
“whenever	  and	  wherever	  violence	  is	  used	  against	  peaceful	  demonstrators,	  we	  must	  not	  
hesitate	   to	   condemn	   it”	  (Cameron,	   2011).	   A	   year	   later,	   US	   comments	   on	   the	   political	  
unrest	  in	  Bahrain	  was	  relegated	  to	  a	  two-­‐paragraph	  statement	  from	  the	  Press	  Secretary	  
(White	   House,	   2012)	   and	   normative	   aspects	   of	   the	   Bahraini	   case	   became	   largely	  
ignored.	  
The	   suspension	   of	   normal	   politics	   in	   this	   instance	   demonstrates	   the	   complexity	   of	  
normal	  politics,	  stressing	  how	  such	  a	  concept	  is	  concept	  specific.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  
structure	   within	   the	   context,	   we	   must	   also	   provide	   more	   specific	   detail	   as	   to	   what	  
‘normal	  politics’	  means.	  For	  many,	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  US	   foreign	  policy	   is	   the	  support	   for	  
democracy,	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  role	  of	  law.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  
uprisings	   in	  Bahrain,	  Western	   leaders	  were	  critical	  of	   the	  handling	  of	   the	  protests,	  yet	  
very	  quickly,	  this	  narrative	  changed	  to	  support	  for	  the	  Al	  Khalifa.	  Such	  a	  move	  can	  easily	  
be	  understood	  as	  the	  suspension	  of	  normal	  politics.	  	  	  
	  
Lessons	  for	  Securitization	  in	  the	  Non-­‐West	  
	  
From	   the	   emergence	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia	   as	   a	   leading	   figure	   in	   the	   post	   uprisings	  Middle	  
East,	  it	  was	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  alignment	  of	  regimes	  across	  the	  region	  would	  take	  
place	   along	   sectarian	   lines.	  While	   formerly	   reliant	   upon	   the	  US	   as	   a	   guarantor,	   Saudi	  
Arabia	  has	  occupied	   this	   role,	  providing	   financial	  muscle	   to	   support	  monarchical	   allies	  
across	  the	  region.	  
	  
What	  we	   see	   from	  our	   two	   case	   studies	   is	   that	   regimes	   in	   Riyadh	   and	  Manama	  have	  
carefully	   sought	   to	   frame	   political	   uncertainty	   and	   human	   security	   issues	   within	   the	  
bigger	   context	   of	   traditional	   conceptions	   of	   security.	   In	   doing	   this,	   the	   more	  
unconventional	   issues	   that	   are	   revealed	   by	   the	   Copenhagen	   School	   and	   securitization	  
processes	   are	   pushed	   into	   the	   background,	   sacrificed	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   remove	   the	  
threat	   posed	   from	  more	   traditional	   sources,	   but	   also	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  maintain	   regime	  
security	  and	  national	  identity.	  
	  
It	   also	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   the	  processes	   of	   securitization	   are	   not	   linear.	   That	   the	  
moves	  made	  by	  ruling	  elites	  to	  ensure	  their	  security	  take	  place	  within	  broader	  networks	  
of	   securitizing	   moves,	   building	   upon	   political	   and	   normative	   environments	   that	   have	  
begun	   to	   characterise	   the	   region.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   there	   is	   undeniable	   ‘spillover’,	  
where	   securitization	   moves	   have	   unintended	   consequences	   across	   the	   region	   –	   and	  
sometimes	  beyond	  –	  as	  speech	  acts	  find	  traction	  within	  a	  number	  of	  different	  contexts.	  
Moreover,	   both	   cases	   of	   securitization	   show	   how	   the	   process	   is	   fluid	   and	   cyclical,	  
wherein	   process	   builds	   upon	   process,	   impacting	   upon	   the	   construction	   of	   normal	  
politics,	   which	   in	   itself	   becomes	   constructed.	   While	   normal	   politics	   is	   typically	  
understood	  as	  the	  politics	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  rules	  and	  structures	  –	  
both	  formal	  and	  informal	  –	  can	  shape	  behavior,	  but	  also	  how	  such	  behavior	  can	  change	  
rules	  and	  structures.	  Whilst	  we	  consider	  particular	   instances	  of	  securitization,	   in	  many	  
cases	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   we	   must	   also	   locate	   them	   within	   broader	   normative	  
environments	  and,	  potentially,	  within	  other	  processes	  of	  securitization.	  
	  
Whilst	  securitization	  deals	  with	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty,	  the	  liberal	  ontology	  inherent	  in	  
the	  term	  is	  challenged	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  legacy	  of	  state	  
building	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   political	   organization	   across	   the	   Middle	   East	   has	  
meant	   that	   securitization	  moves	  within	  one	  state	   speak	   to	  audiences	   in	  others,	  either	  
intentionally	   or	   unintentionally.	   This	   serves	   to	   locate	   securitization	   processes	   within	  
broader	   regional	   security	  dynamics,	   fusing	   levels	  of	  analysis.	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   scope	  
for	   unintentional	   consequences	   to	   emerge	   from	   securitization	   processes,	   with	  
audiences	   spread	   across	   a	   region.	   This	   emerges	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   spread	   of	  
normative	  values	  across	  the	  region	  –	  stemming	  from	  shared	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  ties	  –	  
but	  also	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  shared	  histories,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  perceptions	  of	  
Iranian	  manipulation	  
	  
We	  also	  see	  securitization	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  actors	  at	  different	   levels	  of	  analysis.	   In	  the	  
first	  case	  study,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  urged	  the	  US	  to	  suspend	  normal	  politics	  towards	   Iran.	   In	  
the	  second	  case	  study,	  the	  Bahraini	  ruling	  elite	  attempted	  to	  locate	  the	  uprisings	  in	  the	  
context	   of	   a	   broader	   regional	   struggle	   between	   Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   Iran.	  Whilst	   in	   both	  
cases	  one	  can	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  securitization	  processes	  failed,	  we	  must	  consider	  
alternative	   readings	   of	   success,	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   political	   dynamics	   across	   the	  
region.	  
	  
In	  our	   first	   case,	   Saudi	  Arabia	   attempted	   to	   securitize	   the	   threat	   from	   Iran	   to	   the	  US,	  
calling	  for	  a	  suspension	  of	  normal	  politics,	  whilst	  in	  the	  second,	  the	  Al	  Khalifa	  attempted	  
to	   securitize	   Shi’a	   protesters	   to	   ensure	   their	   survival.	   The	   failure	   of	   the	   first	   strategy,	  
despite	  many	   in	  Washington	  sharing	  Riyadh’s	  concerns,	  would	  drive	  a	  wedge	  between	  
Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   the	   US,	   causing	   Riyadh	   to	   re-­‐calculate	   its	   security	   strategies.	   The	  
second	   case	   also	   demonstrates	   how	   a	   state	   in	   the	   Gulf	   called	   for	   the	   suspension	   of	  
normal	  politics,	  yet	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  that	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  success.	  The	  
success	   of	   the	   second	   process	   of	   securitization	   demonstrates	   how	   shared	   normative	  
environments	  can	  have	  different	  outcomes	  at	  different	  levels.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  case,	  we	  must	  consider	  what	  constitutes	  normal	  politics	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  
indeed,	  within	   the	  Gulf.	   Tensions	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	   and	   Iran	  were	   furthered	  with	  
the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014.	  While	  both	  perceived	  the	  group	  to	  be	  a	  
serious	  threat	  –	  as	  did	  Tehran	  –	  differences	  arose	  with	  regard	  to	  strategy	  in	  Syria,	  with	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  focussing	  on	  toppling	  Assad	  while	  the	  US	  was	  focussed	  upon	  Da’ish	  targets.	  
This	  divergence	  on	  strategy	  reflects	  Riyadh’s	  perception	  that	  Assad	  –	  and	   indeed	  Shi’a	  
organisations	   generally	   –	   posed	   the	   greatest	   threat	   to	   regional	   security	   across	   the	  
Middle	  East.	  	  
	  
Obama’s	  comments	  reflect	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  efforts	  to	  call	  for	  an	  end	  
to	  ‘normal	  politics’,	  particularly	  so	  if	  we	  view	  this	  in	  light	  of	  King	  Abdullah’s	  claims	  to	  ‘cut	  
off	  the	  head	  of	  the	  snake’.	  Instead,	  Obama	  stated	  that	  
	  
The	   competition	   between	   the	   Saudis	   and	   the	   Iranians	  —	  which	   has	   helped	   to	  
feed	  proxy	  wars	  and	  chaos	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  and	  Yemen	  —	  requires	  us	  to	  say	  to	  
our	  friends	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  Iranians	  that	  they	  need	  to	  find	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  
share	  the	  neighborhood	  and	  institute	  some	  sort	  of	  cold	  peace	  (Goldberg,	  2016).	  
	  
Of	   course,	  political	  dynamics	  would	   change	  with	   the	  election	  of	  Donald	  Trump	   in	   late	  
2016.	   Shortly	   after	   taking	  office	   in	   January	  2017,	   Trump	   tweeted	   "Iran	   is	  playing	  with	  
fire	  -­‐	  they	  don't	  appreciate	  how	  'kind'	  President	  Obama	  was	  to	  them.	  Not	  me!"	  (Trump,	  
2017).	   In	   the	   coming	   months,	   this	   rhetoric	   would	   continue,	   building	   upon	   an	  





As	  this	  article	  has	  argued,	  processes	  of	  securitization	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  
and	   that	   although	   the	   general	   framework	   of	   securitization	  works,	   there	   are	   different	  
logics	  at	  play.	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  system	  and	  regional	  security	  complex	  
provides	   a	   different	   set	   of	   logics	   to	   populate	   the	   framework	   of	   securitization,	  
particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  different	  audiences	  and	  the	  power	  of	  normative	  values	  across	  
state	  borders.	  The	  role	  of	  religion	  within	  the	  fabric	  of	  states	  in	  the	  region	  should	  not	  be	  
understated,	  as	  this	  provides	  fertile	  ground	  for	  securitization	  moves	  to	  take	  place,	  not	  
only	  at	  the	  state	  level	  but	  also	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  international	  levels.	  	  
	  
As	  such,	  to	  truly	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  politics	  and	  security,	  we	  must	  explore	  a	  much	  
bigger	   picture,	   drawing	   upon	   history,	   politics	   and	   religion,	   placing	   the	   subjects	   of	   our	  
study	  within	  broader	   regional	   and	   international	  environments.	   The	  penetration	  of	   the	  
region	  by	  hegemonic	  powers,	   in	   this	   case	   the	  US,	   requires	  greater	  exploration	  of	  how	  
securitization	  works	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   analysis;	  moreover,	   we	  must	   ascertain	   how	  
these	  moves	  are	  made.	  What	   is	  all	  too	  clear	   is	  that	  once	  securitization	  processes	  have	  
been	  begun,	  the	  ramifications	  are	  felt	  region	  wide.	  Moreover,	  once	  they	  begin,	  history	  
means	  that	  they	  are	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  stop.	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